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FORUM
(1971),"the Supreme Court shifted
the emphasis from the words them-
selves to the context in which they
were uttered and thereby limited the
doctrine as announced in Chaplin-
sky." Diehl, 294 Md. at 475, 451 A.2d
at 120.
In Cohen, the Supreme Court re-
fused to classify the expression "Fuck
the Draft" lettered on the back of a
jacket worn in a courthouse as
"fighting words" because they were
not directed to the person of the
hearer nor intentionally provoked a
given group to hostile action. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland ap-
plied this narrowed application of
the "fighting words" doctrine in
Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d
41 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977). The court in Diehl adopted
the Downs holding stating that "even
though the views expressed might
be offensive to someone who ov-
erheard them, they were not di-
rected to such persons and, as a re-
sult, were not under the rubric of
fighting words." Diehl, 294 Md. at
476-77, 451 A.2d at 121. However,
Diehl's words were directed toward
someone, specifically, Officer Gavin.
The court opted not to address the
question whether a different and
higher standard applies when the
addressee is a police officer.
The court found direction from
Downs, which "teaches us that the
use of the word 'fuck' is not pun-
ishable in the absence of compelling
reason." Id. at 477, 451 A.2d at 122.
No such compelling reason was
found in this case. The court held
that Diehl had a right to verbally
protest the unlawful exercise of po-
lice authority, and the utterance in
question "though distasteful, force-
fully conveyed the intensity of his
objection." Id. at 478-79, 451 A.2d
at 122. Diehl's words were held to
be no more than an emotional and
emphatic response to Gavin's or-
der. "In such moments, one man's
vulgarity may well be another's ver-
nacular." Id. at 479, 451 A.2d at 122.
State v.
Randall Book Corp.
In State v. Randall Book Corp., -
Md. App. _ ,452 A.2d 187 (1982),
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland reviewed the dismissal of
charges against the Randall Book
Corporation, where the trial court
found Article 27, §416D of the An-
notated Code of Maryland to be un-
constitutionally vague and over-
broad. Section 416D is basically an
obscenity statute, although the
Maryland Legislature deleted the
word "obscene" (primarily due to
the confusion in the law on obscen-
ity handed down by the United
States Supreme Court). Section 416D,
in essence, states that "advertising
the human body depicting sado-
masochistic abuse, sexual conduct
or sexual excitement" is a crime. See
Randall Book Corp., - Md. App. at
- , 452 A.2d at 188.
The appellate court in Randall Book
Corp. noted the recent court of ap-
peals' opinion in Blaine Wilson Smi-
ley v. State, - Md. -, 450 A.2d
909 (1982) and found that case to be
determinative of the constitutional
issue before them. In Smiley, the
court held that Section 416D was
enacted to broadly prohibit adver-
tising which depicted obscenity, en-
abling the court to apply the stand-
ards enuciated in Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973).The court in Smi-
ley found that:
[w]hen the Miller standards are
embodied in section 416D, it
becomes patent that the statute
is not overbroad and vague. By
requiring compliance with the
Miller standards, "a person of
ordinary intelligence [is given]
fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct is forbidden by
the statute," and the statute is
not "so indefinite that 'it en-
courages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions.' "
Smiley, - Md. at -, 450 A.2d at
912, citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979).
The primary issue-the constitu-
tional question-raised in Randall
Book Corp. was answered fully by
the decision in Smiley, and the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded the case against Randall
for further proceedings.
Miller v. State
In Miller v. State, - Md. App.
-, A.2d (1982), Miller
was indicted on charges of robbery
with a deadly weapon, kidnapping,
rape and various other sex offenses.
The charges arose out of an incident
that occurred on October 28, 1980.
On June 16, 1981 Miller's trial began
and he was convicted by June 19,
1981. On appeal, the appellant raised
issues based on lack of trial by im-
partial jury, lack of speedy trial and
based on error in permitting a State
witness to testify despite non-dis-
closure of the witness' name during
the discovery process.
The appellate court addressed the
speedy trial issue first, examining in
detail the circumstances surround-
ing the appellant's arrest and trial
in relation to Maryland Rule 746.
Rule 746 provides in part that:
a trial date shall be set which
shall be not later than 180 days
after the appearance or waiver
of counsel or after the appear-
ance of defendant before the
court pursuant to Rule 723
(hereinafter referred to as the
"180 day rule").
Counsel for the appellant first en-
tered his appearance on December
11, 1980 and pre-trial motions were
heard on June 9, 1981. The appel-
lant contended that June 9, 1981
constituted the 181st day after ap-
pearance of counsel. The court cor-
rected this miscalculation, citing
Maryland Rule 8 which in essence
requires that the day which triggers
the time period is not to be included
in the calculation.
Upon further examination of the
speedy trial issue, the court found
the case of State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md.
App. 20, 425 A.2d 1051 (1981) to be
controlling. As a result of this case,
the court held the appellant had
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waived his right to a trial within the
180 day rule. The court cited from
State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d
356 (1979):
The Court of Appeals held that
the 120 [180] day trial date re-
quirement of Rule 746 was
mandatory and absent extraor-
dinary [good] cause, 'dismissal
of the criminal charges is the
appropriate sanction' (Brack-
eted material represents changes
in the Rule since the decision
in Hicks).
Miller v. State, - Md. App.
_ A. 2d - (1982).
The appellant's trial was first sched-
uled for March 9, 1981, however, at
that time there was no court avail-
able to hear the case. The case was
then assigned to the "move list"
which gave it priority over other
regularly scheduled cases. The trial
judge, in a hearing in chambers at-
tended by appellant, his counsel and
the State, postponed the trial until
June 8, 1981. The appellate court de-
scribed the decision to postpone as
follows:
He ruled from the bench that
because of the magnitude of the
'move list', and the impossibil-
ity of keeping all witnesses
waiting for weeks, perhaps
months to get this case to trial,
in his opinion the record dem-
onstrated 'extraordinary cause'
to justify a postponement of the
June 8th trial date. No objection
to this ruling was made by either
party.
Id. at -, -A. 2d at-_
As no objection was raised by the
defense at any time, the court held
that the defendant had waived his
right to the sanctions afforded by
the Hicks case.
The appellate court next exam-
ined the appellant's contention that
the jury was not impartial due to
the systematic exclusion of young
adults. The court held that the ap-
pellant failed to comply with Rule
754 as he did not object to the jury
array until after completion of the
trial in the appellant's motion for a
new trial. Rule 754 states in part
that:
A challenge to the array shall
be made and determined be-
fore any individual juror from
that array is examined, but the
court for good cause shown may
permit it to be made after the
jury is sworn but before any
evidence is received.
Id. , A. 2d at .
After studying the information on
the composition of the jury array
available to the defense, the court
concluded that "[wihatever objec-
tion the appellant may have had to
the array was obvious to the ap-
pellant when the array of jurors first
appeared in the courtroom." Thus
the appellant's failure to timely
challenge the jury array caused a
waiver of his right to object later.
The court could have decided this
issue solely on the appellant's fail-
ure to comply with Rule 754. How-
ever, the court's analysis continued
on the basis that other cases pend-
ing before the court raised the same
issue of systematic exclusion. The
court went on to examine the con-
stitutionality of the jury selection
process stating that the process is
presumed constitutional unless
proven otherwise. In order to show
that the right to trial by jury has
been unconstitutionally denied, the
appellant must show "(1) that a cog-
nizable group or class of qualified
citizens was excluded; (2) the exclu-
sion was systematic and inten-
tional." After considering testi-
mony presented at the appellant's
motion for a new trial, the court
stated that the appellant had failed
to show that the twenty to forty age
group is a cognizable group. The
court also determined that the ap-
pellant had failed to prove a prima
facie case of systematic exclusion.
Citing the Supreme Court cases,
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482
(1972) and Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545 (1979), the court stated that "[t]he
Supreme Court has required that
improper representation [by a cross-
section of the community] must be
proven over a significant period of time
in order to establish a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination." Thus,
the jury selection process in the ap-
pellant's trial was entirely consti-
tutional.
The effect of non-compliance with
discovery Rule 741 was raised in the
appellant's last issue. The appellant
argued that allowing a State wit-
ness, whose name had not been dis-
closed during discovery, to testify
constituted reversible error. The
court held that although Rule 741
was not strictly complied with, the
defense was given an adequate op-
portunity to talk to the witness dur-
ing a recess granted by the trial court.
The witness' name was also dis-
closed at the beginning of the trial,
at which time the appellant's coun-
sel could have requested a contin-
uance but did not. The defense
raised no objection concerning the
witness. In the final analysis, the
appellate court held that the error
was harmless as the purpose of the
witness' testimony was merely "cu-
mulative to that of a previous State
witness."
In this complete and well rea-
soned opinion, the Maryland Spe-
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